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Abstract
I develop an infinite-horizon alternating-oﬀers model of multilateral negotiations, a common means of
exchange whose strategic complexity has hindered previous modeling eﬀorts. Multilateral negotiations
occur in numerous settings in which one party wishes to trade with one of several others, but for concreteness I consider a buyer facing multiple sellers oﬀering potentially diﬀerent amounts of surplus to be
split. The basic model provides surprising insights about introducing competition to an initially bilateral setting, while straightforward extensions provide empirical predictions about how the buyer’s choice
of conducting procurement via multilateral negotiations or auctions is aﬀected by factors including the
number of sellers, uncertainty when making the choice, and costs of participating in the procurement
process. More generally the model provides a tractable foundation for analyzing strategic problems in
settings featuring multilateral negotiations.

1

Introduction

Bilateral negotiations play an important role in economic theory and practice, but negotiations often are
multilateral in nature. For example, in a procurement setting a firm or government might negotiate to
purchase from one of several suppliers whose products diﬀer on dimensions such as quality or goodness-offit. Likewise, a takeover contest might involve multiple potential acquirers who diﬀer in their synergies or
opportunity costs from completing the transaction. A high-end job candidate might have several employers
maneuvering for position, while a firm contemplating significant foreign direct investment might have multiple
governments as eager suitors.
Multilateral negotiations have received relatively little academic attention despite their empirical relevance, perhaps because their strategic complexity has made them diﬃcult to analyze with formal models.
They feature elements of bilateral negotiations and auctions, both of which are potentially complex exchange
mechanisms that have been the subject of significant amounts of academic research.1 However, analyses
of bilateral negotiations by definition tend to emphasize bilateral settings, with some exceptions described
∗ Email: charles.j.thomas.phd@gmail.com. Patrick Warren provided helpful comments, as did participants in the Industrial
Organization workshop and Junior Faculty Brownbag at Clemson University, and the IFREE lecture series at the Economic
Science Institute (ESI) at Chapman University.
JEL: C78, D44, D82
Keywords: negotiations, bargaining, auctions, procurement, dynamic games
1 For surveys of the bargaining literature see Kennan and Wilson [1993], Ausubel, Cramton, and Deneckere [2002], and
Serrano [2008], while for surveys of the auction literature see McAfee and McMillan [1987] and Milgrom [1989].
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later that require one party to abandon current negotiations before beginning talks with a new potential
trading partner, or that consider exogenously specified outside options rather than endogenously determined
ones. Analyses of auctions focus on multilateral settings, but auctions lack the communication and interplay
inherent to multilateral negotiations.
Incomplete information is an important component of multilateral negotiations’ strategic complexity, so
in this paper I dispense with it to investigate whether existing models of bilateral negotiations with complete
information can be usefully extended to accommodate multilateral negotiations. In Section 3 I describe
related research that evaluates similar issues.
In Section 2 I develop an infinite-horizon alternating-oﬀers model of multilateral negotiations that applies
in numerous settings such as those described earlier, but for concreteness I consider a buyer negotiating
simultaneously with several sellers. The buyer wishes to trade with only one seller, and trade with diﬀerent
sellers can generate diﬀerent amounts of surplus to be split. In some cases rival sellers constrain the terms
of trade to the buyer’s benefit, but in others they are irrelevant to the negotiated outcome. The basic model
naturally extends the bilateral negotiation model from Rubinstein [1982], and it illustrates how negotiated
outcomes are aﬀected by introducing additional sellers into a bilateral setting, by the similarity of sellers in
terms of available surplus, and by the parties’ relative bargaining strengths. One important and unexpected
finding is that the buyer can be better oﬀ when it becomes less patient in multilateral negotiations, which
contrasts sharply with the eﬀect of impatience in bilateral negotiations.
In Section 4 I extend the basic model to evaluate the buyer’s choice of conducting procurement via
multilateral negotiations or an auction, which provides empirical predictions about the important issue of
institutional choice. I find that the buyer tends to prefer negotiations when the number of sellers is small,
when the sellers’ products are distinct or their production costs are quite diﬀerent, and when sellers face entry
costs that are suﬃciently low. One striking finding when sellers incur entry costs is that the buyer’s preferred
procurement mechanism can change multiple times within small ranges of those costs, which provides one
explanation for the coexistence of auctions and multilateral negotiations across apparently similar buyers in
narrowly defined markets.
More generally the model provides a tractable foundation for analyzing strategic problems in settings
featuring multilateral negotiations, including investment, product design, mergers, hold-up, dual-sourcing,
entry, and collusion. Section 5 describes some of those future research possibilities and provides concluding
remarks, while the Appendix contains all proofs.
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The Basic Model of Multilateral Negotiations

Consider a buyer that wishes to trade with at most one of N sellers. Trade between the buyer and seller i
yields a commonly known surplus Vi ≥ 0 to be split between the two parties, where V1 > 0 and the sellers
are indexed so that V1 ≥ V2 ≥ · · · ≥ VN . The buyer and each seller i have instantaneous rates of time
preference rB > 0 and ri > 0. Unlike the Vi , the ranking of the ri across sellers is not tied to the index i.
Trade is conducted as follows, where time is measured in discrete periods t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} that are of length
2
∆ > 0. In even-numbered period t ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . .} each seller i makes a proposal (si,t , Vi − si,t ) ∈ [0, Vi ] to
the buyer that specifies the amount si,t of the surplus Vi that seller i demands for itself, with the remainder
Vi − si,t that it oﬀers to the buyer. The proposals are made simultaneously and are revealed publicly when
received by the buyer, after which the buyer decides whether to accept one of the proposals. If the buyer
accepts one of the proposals, then the negotiations conclude. If the buyer rejects all of the proposals, then
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in odd-numbered period t + 1 ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . .} the buyer makes proposals (bi,t+1 , Vi − bi,t+1 ) ∈ [0, Vi ]2 to each
seller i that specify the amount bi,t+1 of the surplus Vi that the buyer demands for itself, with the remainder
Vi − bi,t+1 that it oﬀers to seller i. The proposals are made simultaneously and are revealed publicly
when received by the sellers, after which the sellers simultaneously decide whether to accept their respective
proposals. From the set of accepted proposals the buyer decides which transaction, if any, to consummate.
If the buyer trades with a seller that accepted its proposal, then the negotiations conclude. If no transaction
occurs, then play continues to the next period.
A transaction that occurs in even-numbered period t between the buyer and seller i yields them respective
payoﬀs (Vi − si,t ) e−rB t∆ and si,t e−ri t∆ , while a transaction that occurs in odd-numbered period t between
the buyer and seller i yields them respective payoﬀs bi,t e−rB t∆ and (Vi − bi,t ) e−ri t∆ . Losing sellers’ payoﬀs
are 0. If no transaction occurs in any period, then each party’s payoﬀ is 0. For notational convenience
define δ k ≡ e−rk ∆ , where δ k ∈ (0, 1) is player k’s discount factor, for k ∈ {B, 1, 2, . . . , N }.
Three issues must be clarified regarding the acceptance of proposals. First, I allow the buyer not to
consummate any transaction even if one or more sellers have accepted a proposal from the buyer. As will
become apparent later, this assumption prevents the buyer from extracting the entire surplus V1 from seller
1 by committing to engage in unfavorable trades. Second, in some period the buyer might accept one of
multiple proposals that give it the same payoﬀ. If so, I assume that from those proposals the buyer accepts
the one from the seller with the lowest index. Third, in some period several sellers might accept the buyer’s
proposal. If trade occurs in such an instance, and if multiple proposals accepted by sellers give the buyer its
highest payoﬀ, I assume that from those proposals the buyer trades with the seller having the lowest index.
The latter two tie-breaking assumptions address an equilibrium existence issue caused by an “openness”
problem that arises because the players’ allowable demands and oﬀers are drawn from continuous sets.
The preceding model extends the bilateral negotiation model in Rubinstein [1982] by allowing one buyer
to negotiate simultaneously with multiple sellers. The assumptions about proposal acceptance and the
public nature of the proposals keep the model close in spirit to Rubinstein’s model, while allowing for the
multilateral aspect.
The players’ strategies consist of proposals and accept/reject decisions at every decision point, all of
which can depend on all prior moves that led to a specific point in the game. I solve for the game’s pure
strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE), and for simplicity I focus on stationary SPNE outcomes:
SPNE outcomes supported by strategies for which each player k receives the payoﬀ π bo
k in all subgames
so
that begin with the buyer making oﬀers, and receives the payoﬀ πk in all subgames that begin with sellers
making oﬀers.2
I characterize this game’s stationary SPNE outcomes by modifying the approach pioneered by Shaked
and Sutton [1984] for solving the bilateral negotiation model from Rubinstein [1982]. Their method uses
four variables. The first two variables are π B and π B , which are the infimum and supremum of the set of
the buyer’s SPNE payoﬀs, for SPNE in subgames beginning with oﬀers from the buyer. The second two
variables are π 1 and π 1 , which are the infimum and supremum of the set of seller 1’s SPNE payoﬀs, for
SPNE in subgames beginning with oﬀers from the seller.
Shaked and Sutton [1984] characterize the extremal SPNE payoﬀs by demonstrating that the following
2 Characterizing all SPNE outcomes has proven to be diﬃcult. It appears that the stationary SPNE outcomes are the unique
SPNE outcomes for three of the four parameter ranges listed in Theorem 1. In the fourth it appears there are multiple SPNE
outcomes. I have characterized some of them, but have been unable to establish I have characterized all of them.

3

four constraints must hold.
πB ≥ V1 − δ 1 π1

π B ≤ V1 − δ 1 π 1

π 1 ≥ V1 − δ B π B

π 1 ≤ V1 − δ B πB

Roughly speaking, the first and third constraints tell a negotiator, “When you are making oﬀers, you need
not give too much.” The second and fourth tell a negotiator, “When you are making oﬀers, you cannot take
too much.” Manipulating these constraints reveals that each must hold with equality, and that
πB = πB =

³

1−δ 1
1−δ1 δ B

´

and π1 = π 1 =

V1

³

1−δ B
1−δ1 δB

´

V1 .

Having established the SPNE payoﬀs are unique, one can show there is a unique SPNE.
The stationary SPNE outcomes with multilateral negotiations are derived by recognizing that versions of
the preceding constraints continue to hold, except in particular circumstances in which the credible prospect
of trading with seller 2 requires modifying one or more of the constraints. In some cases the modifications
involve introducing an even tighter constraint, and in others involve replacing a constraint with a looser one.
Theorem 1 reveals that trade in any subgame occurs between the buyer and seller 1 in the subgame’s initial
period.
Theorem 1 In subgames that begin with the buyer making oﬀers, in all stationary SPNE outcomes the
payoﬀs for the buyer and seller 1 are
π bo
B =
π bo
B =

³

1−δ1
1−δ 1 δB

V2
δ 2B

´

V1

and πbo
1 = δ1

³

1−δ B
1−δ 1 δB

and πbo
1 = V1 −

π bo
B = V1

and πbo
1 =0

π bo
B = V1

and πbo
1 =0

V2
δ 2B

´

V1

h
³
´ ´
1−δ1
if V2 ∈ 0, δ 2B 1−δ
V1
1 δB
h ³
´
i
1−δ 1
if V2 ∈ δ 2B 1−δ
V1 , δ 2B V1
1 δB
¡
¢
if V2 ∈ δ 2B V1 , δ B V1
if V2 ∈ [δ B V1 , V1 ] .

In subgames that begin with sellers making oﬀers, in all stationary SPNE outcomes the payoﬀs for the buyer
and seller 1 are
³
h
³
´
´
³
´ ´
2
1−δ1
1−δ B
1−δ 1
so
πso
B = δ B 1−δ 1 δB V1 and π 1 = 1−δ 1 δB V1 if V2 ∈ 0, δ B 1−δ1 δ B V1
h ³
´
i
2
V2
V2
1−δ 1
πso
and π so
if V2 ∈ δ 2B 1−δ
,
δ
V
V
1
1
B
1 = V1 − δB
B = δB
δ
1 B
¡ 2
¢
so
so
πB = δ B V1
and π 1 = (1 − δ B ) V1
if V2 ∈ δ B V1 , δ B V1
πso
B = V2

and π so
1 = V1 − V2

if V2 ∈ [δ B V1 , V1 ] .

The unique stationary SPNE payoﬀs with multilateral negotiations are more complex than the unique
SPNE payoﬀs with bilateral negotiations, but the derivations of both outcomes share the fundamental
concept that a party formulating a proposal must explicitly consider its counterpart’s payoﬀ from rejecting
that proposal. With bilateral negotiations the counterpart’s payoﬀ from rejecting corresponds to incurring
delay and making a proposal next period. With multilateral negotiations there is the additional influence
of the buyer’s ability to trade with seller 2, which in several instances the buyer can use to dramatic eﬀect.
Theorem 1’s characterization of the buyer’s and seller 1’s stationary SPNE payoﬀs demonstrates that
whether seller 2 aﬀects the negotiations depends on the relationship among V1 , V2 , δ 1 , and δ B . Seller 2 is
more likely to aﬀect the negotiations as V1 decreases or V2 increases, because those changes make sellers 1
4

and 2 closer competitors in terms of what surplus they can oﬀer the buyer. Seller 2 also is more likely to
aﬀect the negotiations as δ 1 increases or δ B decreases, because those changes decrease the buyer’s relative
bargaining strength, and hence the portion of V1 it would obtain if seller 2 were not present. Consequently,
the surplus available from seller 2 is more likely to aﬀect the negotiated outcome.
It is instructive to focus on the novel impact of adding additional sellers to a bilateral setting, which
reveals that for low values of V2 the multilateral negotiations’ stationary SPNE payoﬀs are equivalent to
those from Rubinstein’s model of bilateral negotiations. Sellers 2 through N are strategically irrelevant to
the negotiated outcome when the surpluses available from them are so low, so the negotiations between the
buyer and seller 1 proceed as if those other sellers were not present. Figure 1 illustrates this range of V2 ,
by plotting the buyer’s SPNE payoﬀs in subgames beginning with oﬀers from the buyer (panel (a)), and in
subgames beginning with oﬀers from the sellers (panel (b)). As V2 increases from 0, for a range of V2 the
buyer’s SPNE payoﬀs remain fixed at their levels from bilateral negotiations.
Figure 1 Here
For intermediate values of V2 the multilateral negotiations have an unusual feature: when the sellers
make oﬀers, the buyer’s payoﬀ equals the net present value of what it expects to get next period ( δVB2 versus
getting δV22 next period). Oﬀering a player just enough to induce trade is a typical feature in bilateral
B
negotiations. However, when the buyer makes oﬀers, seller 1’s payoﬀ is less than the net present value of
what it expects to get next period. Instead, seller 1’s payoﬀ is constrained by the requirement that the
buyer not prefer to trade today with seller 2, which is equivalent to the net present value of the buyer’s
payoﬀ from waiting until the next period (V2 versus getting δVB2 next period).
For high values of V2 the multilateral negotiations’ stationary SPNE outcome features the buyer extracting
the entire surplus V1 from seller 1 when the buyer makes oﬀers to the sellers. This is possible because it is
credible for the buyer to trade with seller 2 if seller 1 refuses the buyer’s oﬀer. Hence, it is as if the buyer
can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to seller 1, which enables the extraction of the entire surplus V1 . For
such values of V2 , Figure 1 (b) shows that diﬀerences in the SPNE outcome emerge for diﬀerent V2 based
on what seller 1 must oﬀer when the sellers make oﬀers to the buyer. When δ B V1 > V2 , the buyer’s payoﬀ
is δ B V1 : seller 1 oﬀers the buyer just enough not to reject all oﬀers and get V1 next period, and trade with
seller 2 is not a credible threat. When δ B V1 < V2 , the buyer’s payoﬀ is V2 : seller 1 oﬀers the buyer just
enough not to trade with seller 2, which is a credible threat rather than rejecting all oﬀers and getting V1
next period.
At this point it is worth returning to the modeling assumption that the buyer is not committed to trade
whenever at least one seller accepts the buyer’s proposal. If the buyer were so committed, then with its
proposals the buyer always could extract V1 from seller 1. To see why, imagine the buyer oﬀered > 0
to sellers 1 and 2. In any equilibrium, seller 2 accepts whenever seller 1 rejects, which forces seller 1 to
accept rather than receive a payoﬀ of 0. Letting → 0 completes the argument, which illustrates that such
commitment eﬀectively allows the buyer to always make seller 1 a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. The problem is
that the buyer might prefer not to trade with seller 2, if by doing so the buyer’s payoﬀ V2 − is less than what
the buyer would receive if the negotiations continued to the next period. In the high range of V2 described
in the preceding paragraph, the buyer actually prefers trading today with seller 2 rather than letting the
negotiations continue, so there is no sense in which the buyer has committed to a trade it prefers to reject.
Figure 2 reveals that the equilibrium payoﬀs in Theorem 1 have some unusual properties, relative to the
conventional wisdom derived from bilateral negotiation models. As a function of the discount factor δ B , the
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figure plots the buyer’s stationary SPNE payoﬀ in multilateral negotiations (the solid line) and the buyer’s
SPNE payoﬀ in bilateral negotiations (the dashed line).
Figure 2 Here
Panel (a) considers subgames that begin with oﬀers by the buyer. When the buyer is suﬃciently
impatient, with its oﬀers it extracts the entire surplus V1 from seller 1. This feat is possible because the
buyer is so impatient that it can credibly commit to trade this period with seller 2 if seller 1 rejects the
buyer’s oﬀer.3 For intermediate values of δ B the buyer does worse when it becomes more patient, which
contrasts with the conventional wisdom about the eﬀect of patience on bargaining outcomes. Finally, for
suﬃciently high values of δ B the buyer’s payoﬀ is the same in multilateral and bilateral negotiations, because
the buyer is suﬃciently patient that it can protect its interests without resorting to the threat of trading
with seller 2. Note that the buyer’s payoﬀ at the beginning of this range of δ B is strictly less than its payoﬀ
for very low values of δ B . Only as δ B approaches 1 does the buyer’s payoﬀ return to the same level as when
δ B was small.
Panel (b) considers subgames that begin with oﬀers by the sellers. For low values of δ B seller 1 anticipates
that the buyer will extract the entire surplus V1 if the negotiations reach the next period. To end the
negotiations in this period and get a positive payoﬀ, seller 1 therefore must oﬀer the buyer at least δ B V1 .
However, if V2 > δ B V1 , then the threat from seller 2 requires seller 1 to ensure that the buyer’s payoﬀ is V2 .
Hence, for low values of δ B the buyer’s payoﬀ is V2 , and eventually switches to δ B V1 as δ B increases. Once
again, for intermediate values of δ B the buyer does worse when it becomes more patient, and for high values
of δ B the buyer’s payoﬀ is the same in multilateral and bilateral negotiations.
Corollary 1 evaluates the stationary SPNE outcomes from Theorem 1 as the time period between oﬀers
∆ → 0. Muthoo [1999, Ch. 3.2] suggests this limiting case is the appropriate one to consider, because a
party making a counteroﬀer has incentives to do so quickly to reduce its cost of delay. The limiting values of
the payoﬀs as ∆ → 0 also do not depend on who makes the initial oﬀers, so there is no first-mover advantage
in the limit. Letting ∆ → 0 simplifies matters by eliminating two of the relevant ranges for V2 from Theorem
1, and the stationary SPNE payoﬀs have an intuitively appealing form.
Corollary 1 As the time period between oﬀers ∆ → 0, in all stationary SPNE outcomes in all subgames,
the payoﬀs for the buyer and seller 1 approach
π ∗B =

³

r1
r1 +rB

π ∗B = V2

´

V1

and π ∗1 =

³

rB
r1 +rB

´

and π ∗1 = V1 − V2

V1

h ³
´ ´
r1
if V2 ∈ 0, r1 +r
V1
B
h³
´
i
r1
if V2 ∈ r1 +r
,
V
V
.
1
1
B

These can be written more compactly as
´ i
´ i
h ³
h
³
r1
rB
∗
V
and
π
V1 .
=
min
V
−
V
,
π ∗B = max V2 , r1 +r
1
1
2
1
r
+r
B
1
B
In the limit, a player’s stationary SPNE payoﬀ in a subgame does not depend on whether the buyer or the
sellers are making oﬀers.
3 As mentioned earlier, if the game’s structure required the buyer always to trade according to its best accepted oﬀer, then
the buyer could always extract V1 when making oﬀers: Seller 2 will accept any oﬀer giving it a strictly positive payoﬀ whenever
seller 1 rejects, so seller 1 could never reject an extremely unfavorable oﬀer.
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Corollary 1 completely characterizes the buyer’s and seller 1’s payoﬀs in all stationary SPNE outcomes
as the time period between oﬀers ∆ → 0. In those SPNE the division of the maximum surplus V1 depends
on whether seller 2 constrains the negotiations. If V2 is large enough to constrain the negotiations, then the
buyer’s payoﬀ is higher than it would be if seller 2 were not present, and seller 1’s payoﬀ is lower. This is
direct evidence of the benefit to the buyer of bringing an additional seller into an initially bilateral setting.
If V2 is small enough not to constrain the negotiations, then the buyer’s and seller 1’s payoﬀs are identical
to those in Rubinstein’s model. In fact, setting V2 = 0 gives Rubinstein’s bilateral negotiation model as a
special case.
Comparative statics regarding the players’ stationary SPNE payoﬀs, with respect to the discount rates,
also depend on whether seller 2 constrains the negotiations. If V2 is large enough to constrain the negotiations, then changes in the buyer’s and seller 1’s discount rates do not aﬀect the parties’ payoﬀs. For
example, one special case of seller 2 constraining the negotiations is when V1 = V2 , in which case the buyer
gets all of the surplus and the discount rates are irrelevant. If V2 is small enough not to constrain the
negotiations, then standard comparative statics emerge: as the buyer becomes more patient it does strictly
better in the negotiations and seller 1 does strictly worse, while the reverse holds as seller 1 becomes more
patient.
One thing to notice from the results in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 is that seller 2’s patience is irrelevant
to the negotiated outcome, even though the surplus V2 available from seller 2 might play a role. All that
matters is that seller 2 is ready to give the entire surplus V2 to the buyer when making an oﬀer, and is willing
to accept any oﬀer from the buyer. Therefore, seller 2’s patience is irrelevant because its behavior is driven
entirely by consideration of its payoﬀ in the current period.
In Section 4 I use the unique limiting values of the stationary SPNE payoﬀs π∗B and π∗1 to evaluate the
buyer’s choice of conducting procurement via multilateral negotiations or an auction. The limiting case
seems appropriate given the points raised immediately prior to Corollary 1, and the unique stationary SPNE
outcome seems to be natural one to consider. In Section 4 I also exploit the fact that π ∗B and π∗1 can be
written as functions of the ratio of discount rates, rrB1 , which reflects the importance of relative bargaining
strength, rather than absolute. Before proceeding to that analysis, I place this new model in context.

3

Relationship to Prior Research

Earlier research considers various extensions of bilateral negotiation models to address the idea of a buyer
negotiating with multiple sellers. Below I describe representative examples that use models or ask questions
similar to mine, for the purpose of comparing their structure and predictions with the model described in
Theorem 1.4 ,5 The models that explicitly incorporate multiple sellers assume the sellers are identical, which
conforms to the special case of my model in which V1 = V2 = · · · = VN .
Shaked and Sutton [1984] model bilateral negotiations with complete information and alternating oﬀers.
The buyer bargains with one seller at a time, but can switch to a diﬀerent seller after some commonly known
length of time. Oﬀers from one seller are void upon switching to another seller. The authors find that
4 Other papers that share some similarities include Reinganum and Daughety [1991, 1992], Hendon and Tranaes [1991],
Muthoo [1995], Chatterjee and Dutta [1998], and Marx and Shaﬀer [2010]. Two recent papers that consider multilateral
negotiations with incomplete information are McAdams and Schwarz [2007] and Thomas [2011]. See Thomas [2011] for
references to additional papers with incomplete information that consider some aspects of the multilateral negotiation problem
analyzed there.
5 For clarity’s sake it is worth mentioning that these models and mine address an exchange problem that is distinct from the
multilateral bargaining considered by authors such as Krishna and Serrano [1996], in which multiple players bargain to split
one joint surplus. That setting emphasizes diﬀerent issues and is inherently diﬀerent from the one I am considering.
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the presence of another seller constitutes a credible threat that permits the buyer to obtain greater surplus
than if switching were impossible. The outcome as the switching delay approaches the length of a bargaining
period is identical to the outcome if the buyer instead conducted a first-price auction between the two sellers.
My model lets the buyer bargain simultaneously with multiple sellers, and the negotiations and an auction
have the same outcome only if seller 2 constrains the negotiated outcome.6
Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton [1989] modify Rubinstein’s bilateral negotiation model so that the buyer
can take up a commonly known and exogenously specified outside option only when it rejects the seller’s
oﬀer, while Muthoo [1999, Ch. 5.6] assumes the buyer can take up its outside option only after its oﬀer
is rejected. Shaked [1994] allows the buyer to take up its outside option after either party rejects, but
in each period Nature randomly determines which party makes an oﬀer. All three models’ equilibrium
payoﬀs share similarities with those in Theorem 1 if the payoﬀ from the exogenous outside option equals V2 .
Despite the similarity of the modeling approaches, there are at least two reasons to prefer Section 2’s model
of endogenous outside options. First, the latter model illustrates how the outside option is determined, that
the payoﬀ from the outside option represents the entire surplus available from that alternative trade, and
that the patience of the alternative trading partner is irrelevant. Second, applications like those in Sections
4 and 5 make sense only if the outside options result from decisions by strategic actors.
Vincent [1992] considers simultaneous negotiations by adding an additional seller to a bilateral negotiation
setting with complete information in which only the sellers make oﬀers. He finds that the buyer might not
secure all gains from trade, due to the sellers’ ability to support collusive equilibria through the prospect of
potentially an infinite number of bargaining periods. My model diﬀers from his by allowing both the buyer
and the sellers to make oﬀers. This crucial distinction enables a seller to deviate profitably from collusive
behavior by accepting an oﬀer that ends the game, thereby avoiding retaliatory future punishment from rival
sellers.
Finally, Chatterjee and Lee [1998] model bilateral negotiations with complete information in which the
buyer can hold an oﬀer from one seller while it incurs a cost to acquire an oﬀer from another seller. The
important distinction from my model is that the authors assume the competing oﬀer is a draw from a commonly known and exogenously specified probability distribution, rather than being the outcome of strategic
interaction with another seller.

4

Multilateral Negotiations Versus Auctions

In practice the buyer must choose a method for conducting procurement, and the reality of such decisions
is one reason economists emphasize understanding the performance of diﬀerent voluntary exchange mechanisms.7 In this section I use the unique stationary SPNE payoﬀs from Corollary 1 to directly compare two
commonly used procurement mechanisms: multilateral negotiations and auctions.
Bulow and Klemperer [1996] analyze a buyer’s choice between negotiations and auctions in a setting with
homogeneous products and incomplete information about sellers’ costs. They illustrate circumstances in
which a buyer prefers a simple second-price auction with N + 1 sellers to an optimal mechanism with N
sellers. The authors do not analyze a specific negotiation protocol, but let the optimal mechanism provide
an upper bound on the buyer’s payoﬀ from negotiating. Their results suggest that attracting more sellers
6 As

it would in the special case of my model that conforms to theirs, in which V1 = V2 = · · · = VN .
example, consider how the work by Chamberlin [1948] and Smith [1962] spurred research on the importance of institutions in determining economic outcomes.
7 For
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can be more important than increasing the buyer’s bargaining strength.8 ,9
Prompted in part by the observation that multilateral negotiations and auctions are used by apparently
similar buyers in the same market, Thomas and Wilson [2002, 2005, 2012] use experiments to compare
both exchange mechanisms. In settings with incomplete information they consider first-price and secondprice auctions, homogeneous and diﬀerentiated products, and negotiations that diﬀer in the buyer’s ability
to provide verifiable information to a seller about oﬀers from rival sellers. The authors find that the
mechanisms’ outcomes are similar, and in some cases are statistically indistinguishable. They conduct
experiments because no formally solved models were available that considered the sort of negotiations in
which they were interested.
I evaluate the buyer’s choice by extending Section 2’s basic model in ways that make the institutional
comparison nontrivial; it will be evident that in the basic model the buyer weakly prefers multilateral
negotiations. This section’s goal is to provide some simple extensions that yield theoretical and empirical
insights, and that also suggest more complex or comprehensive extensions.
Three phases comprise the extended game: The surplus-determination phase consists of a move by
Nature that determines the Vi draws according to some commonly known probability distribution. The
planning phase consists of three choices that occur in a specific order: First, the buyer chooses publicly
between conducting multilateral negotiations or a first-price auction. Second, the buyer chooses publicly
which of the N sellers to invite to participate. Third, the invited sellers make simultaneous and public
decisions whether to participate. The procurement phase consists of competition amongst the participating
sellers. That competition is conducted via either the multilateral negotiations described in Section 2, or a
first-price auction in which each seller i makes a simultaneous price oﬀer pi ∈ [0, Vi ] to the buyer. The buyer
purchases from the seller whose oﬀer gives the buyer its highest payoﬀ, Vi − pi , with ties handled in the same
fashion as in the multilateral negotiations. It is straightforward to establish that the buyer’s payoﬀ in a
first-price auction is the second-highest surplus from the set of participating sellers.10
The procurement phase occurs last in the extensions I consider below, but either the surplus-determination
or the planning phase can occur first. The order of those two phases determines whether the buyer and
sellers make their planning choices after or before they know the available surpluses.

4.1

Institutional Choice with Fixed Vi

Consider the case in which the surplus-determination phase occurs before the planning phase, and in which
the buyer incurs an incremental cost of conducting multilateral negotiations versus an auction, C mln ∈ R. I
assume the buyer invites all sellers, and that all invited sellers participate, because participation is costless.
The only substantive diﬀerence from the basic model is the inclusion of the cost C mln .11
From Corollary 1 the buyer’s payoﬀ in multilateral negotiations is
π mln
B

=

π∗B

−C

mln

∙ µ
= max V2 ,

r1
r1 + rB

¶

¸

V1 − C mln ,

8 I do not address this issue in the analysis to follow, but one could do so. It is straightforward to generate examples that
give the opposite conclusion, which suggests the importance of incomplete information in making such comparisons.
9 More recently, Bulow and Klemperer [2009] consider this choice when the mechanisms involve costly entry but diﬀer in
their timing. Their auctions involve simultaneous entry decisions followed by price competition. Their negotiations involve
sequential entry by sellers, where later sellers enter only if trade with earlier sellers is insuﬃciently attractive.
1 0 For example, see Kim and Che [2004]. In this complete information setting the buyer’s payoﬀ also is the same in a Dutch,
English, or second-price auction.
1 1 One also could include costs incurred by the buyer for each seller that participates.
In Subsection 4.3 I consider costs
incurred by each seller that participates.
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while its payoﬀ in a first-price auction is
π fBpa = V2 .
The following result is straightforward to obtain.
Proposition 1 Consider the case in which the surplus-determination phase precedes the planning phase.
The buyer strictly prefers multilateral negotiations if and only if
C

mln

∙ µ
< max 0,

r1
r1 + rB

¶

¸

V1 − V2 .

The buyer’s relative preference for multilateral negotiations intensifies as C mln decreases, as V1 increases or
V2 decreases, and as rrB1 decreases.
This simple extension of the basic model illustrates what factors make the buyer more inclined to use
multilateral negotiations. Figure 3 shows the buyer’s payoﬀ in both institutions, as a function of the ratio
of discount rates rrB1 , for some positive incremental cost of conducting multilateral negotiations, C mln . Each
panel shows a parameter change that increases the range of rrB1 for which the buyer prefers multilateral
negotiations. Panel (a) shows that decreasing C mln has the obvious eﬀect of increasing multilateral negotiations’ attractiveness, because they become cheaper to conduct relative to an auction. Panel (b) shows that
increasing V1 increases the buyer’s payoﬀ from multilateral negotiations while leaving unchanged its payoﬀ
from a first-price auction. Increasing V1 in multilateral negotiations increases the amount of surplus to be
split between the buyer and seller 1, but in a first-price auction has no eﬀect because the buyer’s payoﬀ is
determined solely by V2 . Panel (c) shows that decreasing V2 lowers the buyer’s payoﬀ in both institutions,
but to diﬀerent extents. In a first-price auction decreasing V2 reduces the buyer’s payoﬀ one-for-one, because
the buyer’s payoﬀ is V2 . In multilateral negotiations decreasing V2 leaves the buyer’s payoﬀ unchanged in
the original instances in which seller 2 is irrelevant to the negotiated outcome, decreases the buyer’s payoﬀ
less than one-for-one in a range of cases in which seller 2 initially constrained the negotiations, and otherwise
decreases the buyer’s payoﬀ one-for-one. The net eﬀect makes multilateral negotiations more attractive for
a larger range of relative discount rates, rrB1 .
Figure 3 Here
Finally, each panel of Figure 3 illustrates that multilateral negotiations are relatively more attractive
as rrB1 decreases, which is a crucial element of the buyer’s choice between multilateral negotiations and an
auction. Reducing rrB1 reflects an increase in the buyer’s bargaining strength relative to seller 1, and by
conducting an auction the buyer forgoes any bargaining advantage it might have.

4.2

Institutional Choice with Random Vi and Costless Participation

Now consider the case in which the planning phase precedes the surplus-determination phase. The available
surpluses are unknown when the buyer chooses the procurement mechanism and which sellers to invite, and
when the sellers make their participation decisions. For simplicity I assume the Vi are independently and
identically drawn from U [0, 1]. I also assume ri = rS for each seller i, because otherwise the details of the
institutional choice depend in a straightforward but tedious way on the values of the ri and the realized Vi .
Finally, I assume the buyer invites all sellers, and that all invited sellers participate, because participation
is costless.
10

The buyer’s payoﬀ in multilateral negotiations depends on the highest and second-highest realized Vi ,
while its payoﬀ in a first-price auction depends on the second-highest realized Vi . To calculate the buyer’s
expected payoﬀs one therefore must consider distributions of the highest and second-highest order statistics
of N draws from U [0, 1]. Denoting those order statistics by V(1) and V(2) , the distribution of V(1) is
¡
¢
G1 (v) ≡ Pr V(1) ≤ v = v N ,

the distribution of V(2) conditional on the value of V(1) is

¡
¢
v N −1
G2 (v | w) ≡ Pr V(2) ≤ v | V(1) = w = N−1 ,
w

and the unconditional distribution of V(2) is

¡
¢
G2 (v) ≡ Pr V(2) ≤ v = v N + N (1 − v)v N−1 .

Corollary 1 gives the buyer’s payoﬀ for any particular realization of the Vi , so the buyer’s expected payoﬀ
in multilateral negotiations is
πmln
B

=

∙Z

0

=

1

½Z

0

N −1+

v(1)

³

∙
µ
max v(2) ,

rS
rS +rB

N +1

´N

rS
rS + rB

¶

v(1)

¸

G02

¾
¸
¡
¢
¡
¢
0
v(2) | v(1) dv(2) G1 v(1) dv(1) − C mln

− C mln .

Similarly, the buyer’s expected payoﬀ in a first-price auction is
π fBpa

=
=

Z

1
0

¡
¢
v(2) G02 v(2) dv(2)

N −1
.
N +1

Proposition 2 Consider the case in which the planning phase precedes the surplus-determination phase,
and the Vi are iid draws from U [0, 1]. The buyer strictly prefers multilateral negotiations if and only if

C mln <

³

rS
rS +rB

´N

N +1

.

The buyer’s relative preference for multilateral negotiations intensifies as C mln decreases, as N decreases,
and as rrBS decreases.
Proposition 2 illustrates that the buyer tends to prefer multilateral negotiations for low values of C mln ,
N , and rrBS . Decreasing C mln has the obvious eﬀect of making multilateral negotiations relatively cheaper
to conduct. Decreasing N increases the expected diﬀerence between the highest and second-highest surpluses. As Corollary 1 demonstrates, as that gap increases it is more likely that negotiations outperform an
auction. Likewise, decreasing rrBS strengthens the buyer’s bargaining position, an advantage that is forgone
by conducting an auction.
One also can assess how changing the variance of the Vi draws aﬀects the buyer’s institutional choice,
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say by considering mean-preserving changes in the distribution. A formal analysis is messy, even with the
Vi uniformly distributed, but the following informal argument demonstrates that increasing the variance
increases the relative attractiveness of multilateral negotiations.
£
¤
£
¤
Suppose the Vi are independently and
drawn from U 12 − θ, 12 + θ for θ ∈ 0, 12 . If θ
³ identically
´¡
¢
1
S
is suﬃciently small such that 12 − θ ≥ rSr+r
2 + θ , then seller 2 constrains the negotiations for any
B
¢
¡
realizations of the Vi . That is, even for the highest possible value of V(1) = 12 + θ and the lowest possible
¢
¡
value of V(2) = 12 − θ , V(2) exceeds the buyer’s share of V(1) from bilateral negotiations. Consequently, the
buyer’s expected payoﬀ is the same with multilateral negotiations or an auction, not counting any diﬀerential
cost of conducting negotiations.12 This informal analysis suggests that negotiations are more likely to be
used when sellers are more likely to diﬀer in their available surplus, such as when the buyer’s tastes tend
to be quite distinct for diﬀerent sellers’ products, or when there is significant cost variability across sellers.
Multilateral negotiations outperform auctions in such circumstances because the buyer’s bargaining ability
strongly influences the negotiated outcome, and that ability is wasted by conducting an auction.

4.3

Institutional Choice with Random Vi and Costly Participation

Finally, consider extending the preceding subsection’s analysis by having sellers incur a cost of participating
before they learn the Vi draws, C entry ∈ R+ . This cost can reflect opportunity costs of designing prototypes,
evaluating production costs, assessing the product’s fit with the buyer’s preferences, or formulating an initial
proposal. I assume C mln = 0 to focus attention on the uncertainty when decisions are made.
Costly entry has been considered in other oligopoly models, mainly to determine its eﬀect on prices and
welfare.13 A common finding is that the buyer might benefit from decreasing the size of the pool of potential
entrants, which in my extended model amounts to inviting fewer than N sellers to participate.
As a first step I consider the sellers’ participation decisions when the buyer invites all N sellers to participate, for each institution x ∈ {mln, f pa}. Let π xS (n) denote a seller’s expected payoﬀ from participating
in institution x when a total of n sellers participate.
If C entry < π xS (N ), then each seller participates with probability 1 because it expects a positive net
payoﬀ even if all of its rivals participate. With the Vi drawn from U [0, 1],

π mln
S (N ) =

1−

³

rS
rS +rB

´N

N (N + 1)

and πfSpa (N ) =

1
.
N (N + 1)

f pa
Because πmln
S (N ) < π S (N ), in multilateral negotiations sellers stop participating with probability 1 at a
lower value of C entry than in an auction.
If C entry > π xS (1), then each seller participates with probability 0 because it expects a negative net payoﬀ
even if none of its rivals participate. Once again exploiting the Uniform distribution of the Vi ,

πmln
S (1) =

µ

rB
rS + rB

¶µ ¶
1
2

and πfSpa (1) =

1
.
2

f pa
Because π mln
S (1) < π S (1), in multilateral negotiations sellers stop participating entirely at a lower value of
C entry than in an auction. For later reference note that these values of C entry are invariant to the number
1 2 The

informal analysis is messy for larger values of θ, because in calculating the buyer’s expected payoﬀ one must account
for whether the realizations of the Vi are such that seller 2 constrains the negotiations.
1 3 For example, costly entry is examined in a Bertrand setting by Lang and Rosenthal [1991], in a Cournot setting by Dixit
and Shapiro [1986], and in an auction setting by Levin and Smith [1994].
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of invited sellers, because they are determined solely from a seller’s expected payoﬀ when it is the only
participating seller.
Finally, if πxS (N ) ≤ C entry ≤ πxS (1), then I consider strategies such that each seller participates with
probability ρx ∈ (0, 1). The entry probability depends on the number of invited sellers and the value
of C entry .14 The equilibrium value of ρx equates a seller’s expected payoﬀ from participating and not
participating. Specifically, ρx solves
#
!
"N−1 Ã
X
N −1
x k
x n−1−k x
πS (k + 1) − C entry = 0.
(ρ ) (1 − ρ )
k
k=0
Once the entry probability is derived, the buyer’s expected payoﬀ is
πxB

=

N
X

k=0

Ã

N
k

!

(ρx )k (1 − ρx )n−1−k π xB (k) ,

where π xB (k) denotes the buyer’s expected payoﬀ from institution x when a total of k sellers participate.
Even with the simple expressions for π xB (k) that precede Proposition 2 (substituting k for N as appropriate), the equilibrium values of ρx and π xB do not have convenient analytic expressions. However, the
equilibrium value of ρx can be solved numerically, from which πxB is easily calculated.
Figure 4 reports π mln
and π fBpa as a function of C entry , with panels (a)-(c) featuring diﬀerent numbers of
B
invited sellers. Each panel shows πmln
for three values of rrBS , while π fBpa is invariant to the parties’ discount
B
rates.
Figure 4 Here
The first insight from Figure 4 is that the buyer strictly prefers multilateral negotiations for low entry
costs, and strictly prefers a first-price auction for high entry costs. From Proposition 2 the buyer prefers
multilateral negotiations over an auction for any specific number of participants when C mln = 0, and both
institutions’ eﬃciency implies that the sellers prefer an auction for any specific number of participants. For
suﬃciently low entry costs, all invited sellers participate in both institutions. Therefore, the buyer prefers
multilateral negotiations. As the entry cost increases further, sellers in multilateral negotiations participate
less frequently than they do in an auction. The decreased participation harms the buyer directly in the
negotiations because with fewer sellers the expected value of the highest surplus declines. Eventually this
decline swamps the buyer’s advantage from its bargaining ability. This eﬀect is clearly seen in the extreme
when C entry is such that no sellers enter with negotiations, but some sellers might enter with an auction.
Finding that the buyer’s preferred procurement method depends on entry costs illustrates an important
reason for considering costly entry. Levin and Smith [1994] found no such eﬀects in their analysis of costly
entry with diﬀerent auction formats, because the formats they considered all were revenue equivalent for
any particular number of actual entrants. Hence, the sellers’ entry probabilities were the same across
institutions. In contrast, the fact that payoﬀs in multilateral negotiations and a first-price auction diﬀer for
any specific number of participating sellers causes the buyer’s preference to depend on the level of C entry .
The second insight from Figure 4 is that the value of C entry at which the buyer’s institutional choice
changes increases as the buyer’s relative bargaining strength diminishes. Extreme values of rrBS illustrate
1 4 While there exist asymmetric equilibria in which a subset of invited sellers participate with probability 0, I focus on
symmetric equilibria because of the strategic environment’s symmetry.
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this point clearly. As rrBS → 0 the buyer prefers a first-price auction for any C entry > 0, because the
buyer’s overwhelming bargaining ability ensures that no sellers participate if the buyer uses multilateral
negotiations. As rrBS → ∞ multilateral negotiations and an auction become more similar for any specific
number of participating sellers. Hence, the sellers’ participation probabilities also get more similar, and the
value of C entry increases at which the buyer’s preferred choice changes.
Careful examination of Figure 4 reveals that the buyer’s expected payoﬀ is higher with fewer invited
sellers, for some values of C entry . This result is consistent with findings mentioned earlier from Lang and
Rosenthal [1991] and Levin and Smith [1994], and it stems from the interplay between the number of invited
sellers and the invited sellers’ probability of participating. One implication of this finding is that the buyer’s
ability to restrict the number of sellers it invites might eliminate the change in the buyer’s institutional choice
that was highlighted above. If C entry is such that the buyer prefers an auction to multilateral negotiations
for a certain number of invited sellers, the buyer might still prefer multilateral negotiations after suitably
reducing the number of invited sellers.
Figure 5 illustrates the buyer’s expected payoﬀ when it optimally chooses how many sellers to invite,
restricting attention to a setting in which there are N = 10 sellers available. Each panel reflects a diﬀerent
ratio of the discount rates, rrBS . Each line in Figure 5 is the upper envelope from plotting the buyer’s expected
payoﬀ for each number of invited sellers for a particular institution, such as the three reported in Figure 4.
Figure 5 Here
The first insight from Figure 5 is that, even optimizing over the number of invited sellers, the buyer
prefers multilateral negotiations for suﬃciently low values of C entry , and prefers a first-price auction for
suﬃciently high values of C entry . For very low values of C entry , all invited sellers participate even if all
sellers are invited. In this case the buyer
³ invites all sellers
´ and prefers multilateral negotiations, as shown in
f pa
entry
mln
Proposition 2. For values of C
∈ πS (1), π S (1) , no sellers participate in multilateral negotiations,
but participate with positive probability in a first-price auction. Consequently, for such values of C entry
the buyer prefers a first-price auction to multilateral negotiations.
The second insight from Figure 5 is that the specifics of the buyer’s institutional choice are murky for
intermediate values of C entry . While there obviously is a change at some point from preferring multilateral
negotiations to preferring an auction, there can be multiple such changes as C entry increases. For example, in
panel (b) the buyer’s optimal choice is to invite 2 sellers and use multilateral negotiations when C entry = 0.14,
to invite 2 sellers and use a first-price auction when C entry = 0.17, and to invite 1 seller and use multilateral
negotiations when C entry = 0.23. Once C entry > 0.25 the buyer switches back to inviting 2 sellers and using
a first-price auction.
Finally, one could assess how the eﬀects of costly entry are influenced by the variance of the Vi draws.
An informal analysis similar to that in Subsection 4.2 suggests that the two institutions are equivalent if the
variance of the Vi draws is suﬃciently low. Hence, entry costs would not aﬀect the buyer’s institutional
choice.

5

Conclusions and Future Research

This paper develops a model of multilateral negotiations with complete information by adding additional
sellers to Rubinstein’s classic infinite-horizon alternating-oﬀers model of bilateral negotiations. The model’s
unique stationary SPNE outcomes involve the buyer trading immediately with the surplus-maximizing seller.
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The presence of additional sellers in certain instances provides a measure of protection to the buyer that
enables it to receive higher payoﬀs than it otherwise would. In other instances the additional sellers are
irrelevant, because the surplus available from trading with them is too low to give the buyer a credible
threat to trade with them if seller 1 is intransigent. In the limit as the time between oﬀers goes to 0, these
stationary outcomes have an intuitively appealing structure that is consonant with the SPNE outcome from
bilateral negotiations: The prospect of trade with seller 2 constrains the multilateral negotiations if and
only if V2 exceeds what the buyer would obtain in bilateral negotiations with seller 1.
I apply the model to the buyer’s choice between conducting procurement via multilateral negotiations
or an auction. As a general matter the buyer tends to prefer multilateral negotiations when the buyer is
relatively patient, when the sellers’ products are distinct or their production costs are quite diﬀerent, and
when there are few sellers. In such settings the buyer’s bargaining ability plays a significant role in the
negotiations, and the buyer forgoes that ability by conducting procurement with an auction. However,
the buyer prefers an auction if it is suﬃciently costly for sellers to participate in the procurement process,
because sellers’ anticipated low payoﬀs in multilateral negotiations make them less likely to participate than
if procurement were conducted with an auction. These diﬀerences in the buyer’s institutional preference
are maintained if the buyer can strategically limit the number of sellers it invites to participate, and a new
one emerges: For intermediate entry costs the buyer can prefer either institution, and the preferred choice
can change multiple times as the entry cost increases.
The analysis of the buyer’s choice helps explain why multilateral negotiations and auctions are used by
apparently similar buyers. In some instances the two institutions might coexist because each gives the
buyer the same expected payoﬀ, such as when there is little variation in the surpluses available from diﬀerent
sellers. In other instances buyers might have distinct preferences that depend on factors including variation
in the cost of sellers’ participation across buyers (say because of complexity in determining a seller’s fit with
the buyer’s preferences), diﬀerences in the buyers’ bargaining ability relative to the sellers’, or diﬀerences in
the buyers’ costs of conducting multilateral negotiations.
The model illustrates a setting in which multilateral negotiations can be evaluated straightforwardly,
and the following examples give a sense of the variety of ways in which it can be applied. One could use
the model to evaluate horizontal mergers in markets where the strategic interaction among firms involves
multilateral negotiations. The basic model is suﬃciently simple that one could include merger-specific
eﬃciencies or changes in bargaining positions, changes in product oﬀerings from the merging firms or their
rivals, or entry by new sellers. Likewise, one could consider collusion amongst sellers who repeatedly
compete for the business of buyers. The model’s emphasis on surplus allows consideration of cost diﬀerences
across sellers, or of horizontal and vertical product diﬀerentiation. One also could consider incentives
regarding dual-sourcing, sellers’ investments to reduce costs or improve their products’ goodness-of-fit with
the buyer’s preferences, the buyer’s design of its purchasing requirements, or joint decisions between the
buyer and each seller on relationship-specific investments. Finally, one could use the model as a starting
point for designing experiments. In addition to comparing experimental outcomes to the model’s predictions
regarding parameters such as the available surpluses, the parties’ discount rates, or the number of sellers, one
also can assess whether a structured model of multilateral negotiations can reasonably explain the outcomes
of more realistic unstructured negotiations.
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6

Appendix

This appendix contains proofs of Theorem 1, Corollary 1, and Propositions 1 and 2. It begins with several
lemmas that are used in the proof of Theorem 1.
I will frequently refer to SPNE strategies by σ ≡ {σ B , σ 1 , σ 2 , ..., σ N }, where σk denotes player k’s strategy
bo
in the infinite-horizon game, for k ∈ {B, 1, . . . , N }. Let πso
k and π k respectively denote player k’s stationary
SPNE payoﬀs in subgames that begin with oﬀers from the sellers and from the buyer, for some SPNE σ.
Lemma 1 In subgames beginning with oﬀers from the sellers, all SPNE featuring stationary outcomes involve trade between the buyer and seller 1 in the subgame’s initial period.
Proof of Lemma 1: In an arbitrary subgame beginning with oﬀers from the sellers, consider a SPNE σ
bo
so
bo
that supports the stationary payoﬀs πso
k and π k . Note that π B ≥ δ B π B , because the buyer always can let
play continue to the next period by rejecting all oﬀers in the subgame’s initial period.
I first show that σ involves trade between the buyer and seller 1. The proof involves three cases.
Case 1: Suppose σ involves trade between the buyer and a seller k 6= 1 for which Vk = V1 . Relabel the
sellers so that trade involves seller 1.
Case 2: Suppose σ involves trade between the buyer and a seller k for which Vk < V1 . By following σ,
so
π so
B ≤ Vk < V1 and π 1 = 0.
In the subgame’s initial period, I can show that seller 1 can profitably deviate from σ by oﬀering the
buyer V1 − > π so
> 0. First, the buyer strictly prefers accepting seller 1’s oﬀer, because the
B for some
payoﬀ V1 − the buyer receives by accepting strictly exceeds both its payoﬀ from accepting seller k’s oﬀer
(which is at most πso
B , depending on whether σ specified a trade in the subgame’s initial period), and its
so
payoﬀ from rejecting all oﬀers and letting play continue to the next period (which is δ B π bo
B ≤ π B ). Second,
seller 1 strictly prefers oﬀering V1 − , because the payoﬀ seller 1 receives by doing strictly exceeds its payoﬀ
from following σ (which is 0). The existence of this profitable deviation implies σ cannot involve the buyer
trading with a seller k for which Vk < V1 .
so
bo
bo
Case 3: Suppose σ involves no trade in any period. By following σ, π so
B = π 1 = π B = π 1 = 0. In
the subgame’s initial period, I can show that seller 1 can profitably deviate from σ by oﬀering the buyer
V1 − > 0 for some > 0. First, the buyer strictly prefers accepting seller 1’s oﬀer, because the payoﬀ
V1 − the buyer receives by accepting strictly exceeds both its payoﬀ from accepting any other seller’s oﬀer,
and its payoﬀ from rejecting all oﬀers and letting play continue to the next period (both of which must be
0, else the buyer’s payoﬀ could not be 0 according to σ). Second, seller 1 strictly prefers oﬀering V1 − ,
because the payoﬀ seller 1 receives by doing so strictly exceeds its payoﬀ from following σ (which is 0).
The existence of this profitable deviation implies σ cannot involve no trade in any period.
Cases 1-3 exhaust all possibilities other than trading with seller 1, and so in all subgames beginning with
oﬀers from the sellers, all SPNE featuring stationary outcomes involve trade with seller 1.
I next show that σ involves trade in the subgame’s initial period. Suppose not. Because of discounting,
so
this delay in trading implies πso
1 + π B < V1 . In the subgame’s initial period, I can show that seller 1 can
so
so
profitably deviate from σ by oﬀering the buyer π so
B + for some > 0 such that π 1 + π B + < V1 . First,
the buyer strictly prefers accepting seller 1’s oﬀer, because the payoﬀ π so
B + the buyer receives by accepting
strictly exceeds both its payoﬀ from accepting any other seller’s oﬀer (which is at most π so
B ), and its payoﬀ
bo
so
from rejecting all oﬀers and letting play continue to the next period (which is δ B π B ≤ πB ). Second, seller 1
so
strictly prefers oﬀering π so
B + , because the payoﬀ V1 − (π B + ) seller 1 receives by doing so strictly exceeds
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so
its payoﬀ from following σ (which is π so
1 < V1 − (π B + )). The existence of this profitable deviation implies
σ cannot involve trade not occurring in the subgame’s initial period. ¥

Lemma 2 In subgames beginning with oﬀers from the buyer, all SPNE featuring stationary outcomes involve
trade between the buyer and seller 1 in the subgame’s initial period.
Proof of Lemma 2: In an arbitrary subgame beginning with oﬀers from the buyer, consider a SPNE σ
so
bo
so
that supports the stationary payoﬀs πbo
k and π k . Note that π B ≥ δ B π B , because the buyer always can let
play continue to the next period by refusing to trade with any seller who accepted the buyer’s proposal in
the subgame’s initial period.
I first show that σ involves trade between the buyer and seller 1. The proof involves three cases.
Case 1: Suppose σ involves trade between the buyer and a seller k 6= 1 for which Vk = V1 . Relabel the
sellers so that trade involves seller 1.
Case 2: Suppose σ involves trade between the buyer and a seller k for which Vk < V1 . Trade must
occur in the subgame’s initial period, because by Lemma 1 trade involves the buyer and seller 1 if play
bo
continues to the subgame’s next period. By following σ, π bo
B ≤ Vk < V1 , and π 1 = 0.
bo
so
If π B > δ B π B , then in the subgame’s initial period I can show that the buyer can profitably deviate
from σ by oﬀering Vj to each seller j 6= 1, k , and oﬀering > 0 to sellers 1 and k such that V1 − > Vk − ≥
so
bo
π bo
B − > δ B π B , and V1 − > π B . First consider the buyer’s decision to trade after the sellers make their
accept/reject decisions. If seller k accepts and seller 1 rejects, then the buyer strictly prefers trading with
seller k because the payoﬀ Vk − the buyer receives by doing so strictly exceeds both its payoﬀ from trading
with any other seller j 6= 1, k (which is 0), and its payoﬀ from letting play continue to the next period (which
is δ B π so
B ). If seller 1 accepts, then the buyer strictly prefers trading with seller 1 because the payoﬀ V1 −
the buyer receives by doing so strictly exceeds both its payoﬀ from trading with any other seller (which is at
most Vk − ), and its payoﬀ from letting play continue to the next period (which is δ B πso
B ). Next consider
the sellers’ accept/reject decisions after receiving the deviating oﬀers. In any equilibrium seller k accepts
if seller 1 rejects, because seller k anticipates trading with the buyer and receiving a payoﬀ that strictly
exceeds its payoﬀ from rejecting (which is 0). Consequently, in any equilibrium seller 1 must accept the
buyer’s deviating oﬀer, because it anticipates trading with the buyer and receiving a payoﬀ that strictly
exceeds its payoﬀ from rejecting (which is 0). Finally, making the specified deviating oﬀers gives the buyer
a strictly higher payoﬀ than from following σ. The existence of this profitable deviation implies σ cannot
involve the buyer trading with a seller k for which Vk < V1 .
so
If π bo
B = δ B π B , then in the subgame’s initial period I can show that the buyer can profitably deviate
from σ by oﬀering Vj to each seller j 6= 1 , and oﬀering δ 1 (V1 − π so
> 0.
B ) + < V1 to seller 1 for some
First consider the buyer’s decision to trade after the sellers make their accept/reject decisions. If seller 1
accepts, then the buyer strictly prefers trading with seller 1 because the payoﬀ V1 − δ 1 (V1 − πso
B ) − the
buyer receives by doing strictly exceeds its payoﬀ from trading with any other seller (which is 0), and its
payoﬀ from letting play continue to the next period. To see the latter point, by trading with seller 1 the
buyer’s payoﬀ can be written as (1 − δ 1 ) V1 + δ 1 πso
B − . There are three cases to consider.
• If πso
B = V1 , then by trading in the current period the buyer’s payoﬀ is V1 −
suﬃciently small > 0. Thus, the buyer prefers trading in the current period.

> δ B V1 = πbo
B for

so
• If 0 < π so
B < V1 , then by trading in the current period the buyer’s payoﬀ strictly exceeds π B −
π bo
bo
B
δ B − > π B , for suﬃciently small > 0. Thus, the buyer prefers trading in the current period.
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=

bo
• If 0 = π so
B , then π B = 0, and by trading in the current period the buyer’s payoﬀ is (1 − δ 1 ) V1 − > 0
¡
¢
= π bo
B for suﬃciently small > 0. Thus, the buyer prefers trading in the current period.

Next consider the sellers’ accept/reject decisions. If the buyer oﬀers seller 1 δ 1 (V1 − πso
B ) + , then seller
1 strictly prefers accepting. By accepting seller 1 anticipates trading with the buyer this period and getting
so
a payoﬀ of δ 1 (V1 − π so
B ) + , while by rejecting seller 1 expects at best a strictly lower payoﬀ δ 1 (V1 − π B ).
Therefore, making the specified oﬀers gives the buyer a strictly higher payoﬀ than from following σ. The
existence of this profitable deviation implies σ cannot involve the buyer trading with a seller k for which
Vk < V1 .
Case 3: Suppose σ involves no trade in any period. Once play reaches the subgame’s second period
(in which sellers make oﬀers to the buyer), by Lemma 1 trade will occur, which is a contradiction.
Cases 1-3 exhaust all possibilities other than trading with seller 1, and so in all subgames beginning with
oﬀers from the buyer, all SPNE featuring stationary outcomes involve trade with seller 1.
I next show that σ involves trade in the subgame’s initial period. Suppose not. Because of discounting,
bo
this delay in trading implies πbo
1 + π B < V1 . In the subgame’s initial period, I can show that the buyer can
bo
bo
profitably deviate from σ by oﬀering seller 1 πbo
1 + for some > 0 such that π 1 + π B + < V1 , while making
oﬀers to the remaining sellers according to σ. First, the buyer strictly prefers trading with seller 1 if seller
¡
¢
1 accepts this oﬀer, because the buyer’s payoﬀ V1 − π bo
from doing so strictly exceeds its payoﬀ from
1 +
bo
trading with any other seller (which is at most π B ), and its payoﬀ from rejecting all oﬀers and letting play
bo
continue to the next period (which is δ B πso
B ≤ π B ). Second, seller 1 strictly prefers accepting the buyer’s
oﬀer, because its payoﬀ π bo
1 + from doing so strictly exceeds its payoﬀ from rejecting the oﬀer (which is at
bo
most π 1 ). Therefore, the buyer strictly prefers oﬀering π bo
1 + to seller 1, because doing so gives the buyer
a strictly higher payoﬀ than from following σ. The existence of this profitable deviation implies σ cannot
involve trade not occurring in the subgame’s initial period. ¥
£
¤
bo
Lemma 3 In all stationary SPNE outcomes, π so
1 = V1 − max V2 , δ B π B .

Proof of Lemma 3: In an arbitrary subgame beginning with oﬀers from the sellers, consider a SPNE σ
bo
that supports the stationary payoﬀs πso
k and π k .
£
¤
bo
Suppose πso
In the subgame’s initial period, I can show that seller 1 can
1 < V1 − max V2 , δ B π B .
£
¤
so
profitably deviate from σ by demanding π 1 + < V1 − max V2 , δ B πbo
B , for some > 0. The buyer strictly
£
¤
bo
prefers accepting this demand, because its payoﬀ from doing so is V1 − (πso
1 + ) > max V2 , δ B π B , where
£
¤
max V2 , δ B π bo
B is the highest payoﬀ the buyer can get by rejecting seller 1’s demand (either at most V2
by trading this period with another seller, or δ B πbo
B by rejecting all oﬀers and letting play continue to the
next period). Given the buyer’s anticipated behavior, seller 1’s payoﬀ from demanding πso
strictly
1 +
so
exceeds its payoﬀ from following σ (which is π1 ). The existence of this profitable deviation implies that
£
¤
bo
π so
1 ≥ V1 − max V2 , δ B π B .
¤
£
bo
Now suppose π so
1 > V1 −max V2 , δ B π B . In the subgame’s initial period, by Lemma 1 the buyer’s payoﬀ
¤
£
bo
bo
according to σ is V1 − πso
1 < max V2 , δ B π B . If δ B π B ≥ V2 , then the buyer strictly prefers rejecting all
oﬀers and letting play continue to the next period, because the buyer’s payoﬀ δ B π bo
B from doing so strictly
bo
exceeds its payoﬀ from following σ. If V2 > δ B π B , then seller 2 strictly prefers deviating from σ by oﬀering
£
¤
bo
V2 − > max V1 − πso
1 , δ B π B , for some > 0. The buyer strictly prefers accepting seller 2’s oﬀer, because
the buyer’s payoﬀ V2 − from doing so strictly exceeds its payoﬀ both from accepting seller 1’s oﬀer (which is
bo
V1 −π so
1 ), and its payoﬀ from rejecting all oﬀers and letting play continue to the next period (which is δ B π B ).
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Given the buyer’s anticipated behavior, seller 2’s payoﬀ from oﬀering V2 − strictly exceeds its payoﬀ from
£
¤
bo
following σ (which is 0). The existence of these profitable deviations implies πso
1 ≤ V1 − max V2 , δ B π B .
£
¤
bo
The arguments in the two preceding paragraphs imply πso
1 = V1 − max V2 , δ B π B . ¥
bo
Lemma 4 In all stationary SPNE outcomes, if V2 > δ B (V1 − π so
1 ), then π B = V1 .

Proof of Lemma 4: In an arbitrary subgame beginning with oﬀers from the buyer, consider a SPNE σ
so
so
that supports the stationary payoﬀs πbo
k and π k , and for which V2 > δ B (V1 − π 1 ).
Suppose π bo
B < V1 . In the subgame’s initial period, I can show that the buyer can profitably deviate
so
from σ by demanding V1 − 2 > π bo
> 0,
B from seller 1 and V2 − > δ B (V1 − π 1 ) from seller 2, for some
and demanding 0 from all other sellers.
First consider the buyer’s decision whether to trade with any seller that has accepted the buyer’s proposal.
If seller 1 accepts the buyer’s oﬀer, then the buyer strictly prefers trading this period with seller 1, because
the buyer’s payoﬀ V1 − 2 from doing so strictly exceeds the buyer’s payoﬀ from trading this period with any
other seller (which is at most V2 − ), and its payoﬀ from letting play continue to the next period (which
is δ B (V1 − π so
If seller 2 accepts the buyer’s oﬀer and seller 1 rejects, then the buyer strictly prefers
1 )).
trading this period with seller 2, because the buyer’s payoﬀ V2 − from doing so strictly exceeds its payoﬀ
from trading this period with any other seller (which is 0), and its payoﬀ from letting play continue to the
next period (which is δ B (V1 − πso
1 )).
Now consider the sellers’ decisions to accept or reject the buyer’s proposals. If seller 1 rejects the buyer’s
oﬀer, then seller 2 strictly prefers accepting to rejecting the buyer’s oﬀer: the buyer will trade this period
with seller 2, as noted in the preceding paragraph. Seller 2’s payoﬀ in this case is > 0, which strictly
exceeds its payoﬀ from rejecting the buyer’s oﬀer (which is 0).
Because of seller 2’s incentives, if seller 1 rejects the buyer’s oﬀer, then seller 1’s payoﬀ is 0. If seller 1
accepts the buyer’s oﬀer, then seller 1’s payoﬀ is 2 > 0. Hence, seller 1 accepts the buyer’s oﬀer 2 .
Finally, given the sellers’ anticipated behavior the buyer strictly prefers making these deviating oﬀers,
because the buyer’s payoﬀ V1 − 2 from doing strictly exceeds its payoﬀ from following σ. The existence of
this profitable deviation implies that it cannot be that πbo
B < V1 , according to σ, so it must be the case that
bo
π B = V1 . ¥
bo
so
Lemma 5 In all stationary SPNE outcomes, if V2 < δ B (V1 − π so
1 ), then π B = V1 − δ 1 π 1 .

Proof of Lemma 5: In an arbitrary subgame beginning with oﬀers from the buyer, consider a SPNE σ
so
so
that supports the stationary payoﬀs πbo
k and π k , and for which V2 < δ B (V1 − π 1 ).
so
Suppose π bo
B < V1 − δ 1 π 1 . In the subgame’s initial period, I can show that the buyer can profitably
so
deviate from σ by demanding πbo
> 0 such that πbo
B + from seller 1, for some
B + < V1 − δ 1 π 1 . First
consider the buyer’s decision to trade after the sellers make their accept/reject decisions. If seller 1 accepts,
then the buyer strictly prefers trading with seller 1 this period, because the buyer’s payoﬀ π bo
B + from doing
so strictly exceeds its payoﬀ from trading with another seller or letting play continue to next period (both of
which are at most πbo
B ). Next consider the sellers’ accept/reject decisions after observing the deviating oﬀer.
¡
¢
Seller 1 strictly prefers accepting the oﬀer, because seller 1’s payoﬀ V1 − π bo
from doing so strictly
B +
so
exceeds its payoﬀ from rejecting (which is at most δ 1 π1 ). Given seller 1’s anticipated behavior, the buyer
strictly prefers deviating from σ in this fashion, because the buyer’s payoﬀ πbo
B + doing so strictly exceeds
so
its payoﬀ from following σ. The existence of this profitable deviation implies that πbo
B ≥ V1 − δ 1 π 1 .
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so
Now suppose π bo
B > V1 −δ 1 π 1 . By following σ, according to Lemma 2 trade takes place in the subgame’s
bo
initial period, which implies seller 1’s payoﬀ is πbo
1 = V1 − π B . If seller 1 deviates from σ by rejecting the
buyer’s equilibrium oﬀer, and if the buyer does not trade with any other seller in the subgame’s initial period,
bo
then seller 1’s payoﬀ is δ 1 π so
1 > π 1 . If seller 1 rejects the buyer’s oﬀer, then the buyer will not trade with
any other seller in the subgame’s initial period. The highest payoﬀ the buyer can get is V2 by trading with
seller 2, but by waiting until the next period the buyer gets a payoﬀ of δ B (V1 − π so
1 ) > V2 . Therefore, it is
profitable for seller 1 to reject the buyer’s equilibrium oﬀer in the subgame’s initial period, which contradicts
so
σ as a SPNE. Therefore, it must be the case that πbo
B ≤ V1 − δ 1 π 1 .
so
The arguments in the two preceding paragraphs imply πbo
B = V1 − δ 1 π 1 . ¥
so
Lemma 6 In all stationary SPNE outcomes, if V2 = δ B (V1 − π so
1 ), then π 1 = V1 −

V2
δB .

Proof of Lemma 6: Follows from simple algebra. ¥
With the preceding results, the stationary equilibrium payoﬀs can be derived for each of four cases.

6.1

Case 1: V2 < δB (V1 − π so
1 )

Lemma 7 If V2 < δ B (V1 − π so
1 ), then
π bo
B =

³

1−δ1
1−δ 1 δB

´

V1

πbo
1 = δ1

³

1−δ B
1−δ 1 δB

´

πso
B = δB

V1

³

1−δ1
1−δ 1 δB

´

πso
1 =

V1

³

1−δ B
1−δ 1 δB

´

V1 .

£
¤
bo
so
Proof of Lemma 7: By Lemma 3, πso
1 = V1 − max V2 , δ B π B . Substituting the expression for π 1 into
£
¤
the condition for Lemma 7 requires V2 < δ B max V2 , δ B πbo
B , so for Lemma 7’s condition to hold requires
£
¤
bo
bo
δ B π B = max V2 , δ B π B .
so
so
bo
By Lemma 5, πbo
B = V1 − δ 1 π 1 . Substituting the expression for π 1 into the expression for π B yields
¡
¢
bo
⇐⇒ π bo
π bo
B = V1 − δ 1 V1 − δ B π B
B =

µ

1 − δ1
1 − δ1δB

¶

V1 .

³
´
1−δ B
so
so
Substituting the derived value for πbo
B into the expression for π 1 yields π 1 = 1−δ1 δ B V1 . By Lemmas 1
³
´
³
´
1−δ B
1−δ 1
so
and 2, π bo
1 = δ 1 1−δ1 δ B V1 and π B = δ B 1−δ1 δ B V1 . These are the desired results. ¥
2
Lemma 8 If V2 < δ B (V1 − π so
1 ), then V2 < δ B

³

1−δ1
1−δ 1 δB

´

V1 .

³
´
1−δB
so
If V2 < δ B (V1 − πso
Substituting that
1 ), then π 1 =
1−δ1 δ B V1 by Lemma 7.
³
´
1−δ 1
expression into the condition for Lemma 8 yields V2 < δ 2B 1−δ
V1 , which is the desired result. ¥
1 δB

Proof of Lemma 8:

6.2

bo
Case 2: V2 > δB (V1 − π so
1 ) and V2 ≥ δ B π B

bo
Lemma 9 If V2 > δ B (V1 − π so
1 ) and V2 ≥ δ B π B , then

π bo
B = V1

π bo
1 =0

π so
B = V2
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π so
1 = V1 − V2 .

£
¤
bo
Proof of Lemma 9: By Lemma 3, π so
1 = V1 − max V2 , δ B π B , so the second condition for Lemma 9
bo
bo
so
implies πso
1 = V1 − V2 . By Lemma 4, π B = V1 . By Lemmas 1 and 2, π 1 = 0 and π B = V2 . These are the
desired results. ¥
bo
Lemma 10 If V2 > δ B (V1 − πso
1 ) and V2 ≥ δ B π B , then V2 ≥ δ B V1 .
bo
Proof of Lemma 10: If V2 > δ B (V1 − π so
1 ) and V2 ≥ δ B π B , then substituting the stationary SPNE
payoﬀs derived in Lemma 9 into the conditions for Lemma 10 yields V2 > δ B V2 and V2 ≥ δ B V1 . The first
constraint holds trivially, so the relevant constraint is the second one. This is the desired result. ¥

6.3

bo
Case 3: V2 > δB (V1 − π so
1 ) and V2 < δ B π B

bo
Lemma 11 If V2 > δ B (V1 − πso
1 ) and V2 < δ B π B , then

πbo
B = V1

π bo
1 =0

πso
B = δ B V1

π so
1 = (1 − δ B ) V1 .

£
¤
so
bo
Proof of Lemma 11: By Lemma 4, πbo
B = V1 . By Lemma 3, π 1 = V1 − max V2 , δ B π B , so the second
bo
so
condition for Lemma 11 implies π so
1 = (1 − δ B ) V1 . By Lemmas 1 and 2, π 1 = 0 and π B = δ B V1 . These
are the desired results. ¥
2
bo
Lemma 12 If V2 > δ B (V1 − πso
1 ) and V2 < δ B π B , then δ B V1 < V2 < δ B V1 .
bo
Proof of Lemma 12: If V2 > δ B (V1 − π so
1 ) and V2 < δ B π B , then substituting the stationary SPNE
payoﬀs derived in Lemma 11 into the conditions for Lemma 12 yields V2 > δ 2B V1 and V2 < δ B V1 . These are
the desired results. ¥

6.4

Case 4: V2 = δB (V1 − π so
1 )

Lemma 13 If V2 = δ B (V1 − πso
1 ), then
π bo
B =

V2
δ2B

π bo
1 = V1 −

V2
δ2B

πso
B =

V2
δB

π so
1 = V1 −

V2
δB .

£
¤
V2
bo
By Lemma 3, πso
Proof of Lemma 13: By Lemma 6, πso
1 = V1 − δ B .
1 = V1 − max V2 , δ B π B , so
£
¤
V2
bo
substituting the value of π so
1 derived in Lemma 6 yields δ B = max V2 , δ B π B . Given that δ B < 1, it must
£
¤
V2
V2
V2
bo
bo
bo
so
be that δ B πbo
B = max V2 , δ B π B . Therefore, π B = δ 2B . By Lemmas 1 and 2, π 1 = V1 − δ 2B and π B = δ B .
These are the desired results. ¥
³
´
2
2
1−δ 1
Lemma 14 If V2 = δ B (V1 − πso
1 ), then δ B 1−δ 1 δ B V1 ≤ V2 ≤ δ B V1 .

Proof of Lemma 14: If V2 = δ B (V1 − π so
1 ), then the stationary SPNE payoﬀs derived in Lemma 13 are
V2
V2
bo
π so
=
V
−
and
π
=
.
From
the
first expression, the restriction that π so
1
1
1 ≥ 0 implies that the
B
δB
δ 2B
proposed solution’s validity requires V2 ≤ δ B V1 . From the second expression, the restriction that πbo
B ≤ V1
2
implies that the proposed solution’s validity requires V2 ≤ δ B V1 . The second constraint is tighter than is
the first, so the second constraint is the relevant of the two constraints.
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so
Another restriction is that πbo
1 ≤ δ 1 π 1 . If not, then the buyer would be oﬀering seller 1 strictly more
than necessary to induce seller 1 to accept the buyer’s oﬀer. Given the values of the stationary SPNE payoﬀs
derived in Lemma 13, the proposed solution’s validity requires

µ
¶
µ
¶
V2
V2
1 − δ1
2
V1 − 2 ≤ δ 1 V1 −
⇐⇒ δ B
V1 ≤ V2 .
δB
1 − δ1δB
δB
Combining the two parameter restrictions implies that the proposed solution’s validity requires δ 2B
V2 ≤

δ 2B V1 ,

which is the desired result. ¥

³

1−δ1
1−δ 1 δB

´

V1 ≤

The preceding Lemmas now can be used to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem
separately
four sets
h
h considers
³ 1: The
´ proof
´
³
´
i of possible values for V2 .
2
2
1−δ 1
1−δ1
If V2 ∈ 0, δ B 1−δ1 δB V1 , then V2 ∈
/ δ B 1−δ1 δB V1 , V1 . The contrapositives of Lemmas 10 and
12 imply it is not the case that V2 > δ B (V1 − π so
1 ), while the contrapositive of Lemma 14 implies that it is
so
not the case that V2 = δ B (V1 − π1 ). Hence, it must be the case that V2 < δ B (V1 − π so
1 ). Therefore, by
Lemma 7 the
payoﬀs
must
be
as
specified
in
Theorem
1.
h ³
h
´
i
³
´ ´
¡
¤
2
2
1−δ 1
1−δ 1
If V2 ∈ δ 2B 1−δ
,
δ
V
∈
/
0,
δ
/ δ 2B V1 , V1 . The contrapositive
V
,
then
V
1
1
2
B
B 1−δ1 δ B V1 and V2 ∈
1 δB
of Lemma 8 implies that it is not the case that V2 < δ B (V1 − π so
1 ), while the contrapositives of Lemmas 10
and 12 imply it is not the case that V2 > δ B (V1 − πso
).
Hence,
it must be the case that V2 = δ B (V1 − π so
1
1 ).
Therefore, by Lemma 13 the payoﬀshmust ³be as specified
h ³ 1. ´
´ ´ in Theorem
i
¡ 2
¢
2
2
1−δ1
1−δ1
If V2 ∈ δ B V1 , δ B V1 , then V2 ∈
/ 0, δ B 1−δ1 δB V1 , V2 ∈
/ δ 2B 1−δ
,
δ
V
/ [δ B V1 , V1 ].
V
, and V2 ∈
1
1
B
1 δB
so
The contrapositive of Lemma 8 implies that it is not the case that V2 < δ B (V1 − π1 ), the contrapositive
of Lemma 14 implies that it is not the case that V2 = δ B (V1 − π so
1 ), while the contrapositive of Lemma 10
so
implies that it is not the case that both V2 > δ B (V1 − π 1 ) and V2 ≥ δ B πbo
B hold. Hence, it must be the
so
bo
case that V2 > δ B (V1 − π1 ) and V2 < δ B πB . Therefore, by Lemma 11 the payoﬀs must be as specified in
Theorem 1.
If V2 ∈ [δ B V1 , V1 ], then V2 ∈
/ [0, δ B V1 ). The contrapositive of Lemma 8 implies that it is not the case that
so
V2 < δ B (V1 − π 1 ), the contrapositive of Lemma 14 implies that it is not the case that V2 = δ B (V1 − π so
1 ),
so
while the contrapositive of Lemma 12 implies that it is not the case that both V2 > δ B (V1 − π 1 ) and
bo
V2 < δ B πbo
Hence, it must be the case that V2 > δ B (V1 − πso
Therefore, by
1 ) and V2 ≥ δ B π B .
B hold.
Lemma 9 the payoﬀs must be as specified in Theorem 1. ¥
Proof of Corollary 1: Recalling that the discount factor δ k is defined as δ k ≡ e−rk ∆ , the buyer’s payoﬀs
from Theorem 1 can be written as
³
h
´
³
´ ´
1−e−r1 ∆
1−e−r1 ∆
−2rB ∆
πbo
V1
B = 1−e−r1 ∆ e−rB ∆ V1 if V2 ∈ 0, e
1−e−r1 ∆ e−rB ∆
³
´
i
h
−r1 ∆
V2
πbo
V1 , e−2rB ∆ V1
if V2 ∈ e−2rB ∆ 1−e1−e
−r1 ∆ e−rB ∆
B = e−2rB ∆
¢
¡
πbo
if V2 ∈ e−2rB ∆ V1 , e−rB ∆ V1
B = V1
£
¤
πbo
if V2 ∈ e−rB ∆ V1 , V1
B = V1
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and
−rB ∆
πso
B =e

πso
B =

V2
e−rB ∆

³

1−e−r1 ∆
1−e−r1 ∆ e−rB ∆

´

−rB ∆
πso
V1
B =e

πso
B = V2

V1

h
³
´ ´
−r1 ∆
if V2 ∈ 0, e−2rB ∆ 1−e1−e
V1
−r
∆
−r1 ∆ e
B
h
³
´
i
−r1 ∆
−2rB ∆
if V2 ∈ e−2rB ∆ 1−e1−e
,
e
V
V
−r
∆
1
1
−r1 ∆ e
B
¡ −2r ∆
¢
if V2 ∈ e B V1 , e−rB ∆ V1
£
¤
if V2 ∈ e−rB ∆ V1 , V1 .

so
By Lemmas 1 and 2 one can derive the associated values for π bo
1 and π 1 .
requires using L’Hopital’s rule, which gives the desired result. ¥

6.5

Taking the limit as ∆ −→ 0

Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2

Proof of Proposition 1: The buyer strictly prefers multilateral negotiations if and only if its payoﬀ from
multilateral negotiations strictly exceeds its payoﬀ from a first-price auction. That condition amounts to
π mln
B

>

π fBpa

∙ µ
⇐⇒ max V2 ,

r1
r1 + rB

¶

¸

V1 − C mln > V2 .

The latter expression is equivalent to
∙ µ
C mln < max 0,

r1
r1 + rB

¶

¸
V1 − V2 ,

(1)

which is the desired result.
The buyer’s relative preference for multilateral negotiations intensifies as π mln
− πfBpa increases. That
B
condition corresponds to relaxing (1), which is accomplished by decreasing C mln , increasing V1 , decreasing
V2 , or decreasing rrB1 . ¥
Proof of Proposition 2: The buyer strictly prefers multilateral negotiations if and only if its expected
payoﬀ from multilateral negotiations strictly exceeds its expected payoﬀ from a first-price auction. That
condition amounts to

π mln
> π fBpa ⇐⇒
B

N +1

´N

³

´N

N −1+

The latter expression is equivalent to
C mln <

³

rS
rS +rB

rS
rS +rB

N +1

− C mln >

,

N −1
.
N +1

(2)

which is the desired result.
The buyer’s relative preference for multilateral negotiations intensifies as π mln
− πfBpa increases. That
B
condition corresponds to relaxing (2), which is accomplished by decreasing C mln , decreasing N , or decreasing
rB
r1 . ¥
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(b) Buyer’s stationary SPNE payoffs when sellers make offers

Figure 1. Buyer’s Stationary Payoffs in Multilateral Negotiations, as a Function of V2. Panel (a) shows the
buyer’s SPNE payoffs as a function of V2, in subgames beginning with offers from the buyer. Panel (b) shows
the buyer’s SPNE payoffs as a function of V2, in subgames beginning with offers from the sellers. These figures
are calculated using V1 = 1, δ1 = 0.8, δB = 0.8. Dashed line is 45○-line.
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(b) Buyer’s stationary SPNE payoffs when sellers make offers

Figure 2. Buyer’s Stationary Payoffs in Multilateral Negotiations, as a Function of δB. Panel (a) shows the
buyer’s SPNE payoffs as a function of δB, in subgames beginning with offers from the buyer. Panel (b) shows
the buyer’s SPNE payoffs as a function of δB, in subgames beginning with offers from the sellers. These figures
are calculated using V1 = 1 , V2 = 0.6, δ1 = 0.8. Solid line is stationary SPNE payoff, and dashed line is SPNE
payoff from bilateral negotiations.
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Figure 3. Comparative Statics of Buyer’s Payoffs in Multilateral Negotiations and a First-Price Auction.
Each panel shows the buyer’s payoffs with initial parameters and with one changed parameter (changes denoted
by a tilde). Panel (a) decreases Cmln, panel (b) increases V1, and panel (c) decreases V2. Each change intensifies
the buyer’s relative preference for multilateral negotiations over a first-price auction.
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Figure 4. Buyer’s Expected Payoffs in Multilateral Negotiations and a First-Price Auction, with Fixed
Number of Sellers. Each panel shows the buyer’s payoffs for a particular value of N, and with different ratios
of discount rates rB/rS. N = 2 in panel (a), N = 4 in panel (b), and N = 6 in panel (c). Multilateral negotiation
payoffs are dashed lines, first-price auction payoff is solid line.
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Figure 5. Buyer’s Expected Payoffs in Multilateral Negotiations and a First-Price Auction, with Optimal
Number of Sellers. Each panel shows the buyer’s payoffs for a particular ratio of discount factors, and with
optimal number of invited sellers. rB/rS = 0.25 in panel (a), rB/rS = 1 in panel (b), and rB/rS = 4 in panel (c).
Multilateral negotiation payoff is dashed line, first-price auction payoff is solid line.
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